just its creators.5
This perspective represents more than simply an incremental variation on previous Western approaches to the ontology of the divine. Indeed, it might well be read as a dialectical metamorphosis of traditional theism. Briefly put, traditional Western theism understands the divine as a transcendent Supreme Being. Modernity negates theism by reducing it to a projection of human subjectivity. The feminist position negates this negation by conceiving of the divine as neither an independent supernatural being nor a product of misplaced human imagination, but as a way of existence, a particular kind of relation that human beings can enact between themselves and others and between themselves and nonhuman beings and forces.
Feminist theology is obviously not a monolithic movement. There are many types of feminist religious thought, and tensions surely exist between different feminist theological camps, tensions indicated by labels such as "reformers" and "revolutionaries" or "feminists" and "womanists." Yet the radical ontological motif of interest here seems to cut across some of these divisions: its traces can be found as easily in the thought of Rosemary Radford Ruether as in that of Carol Christ. Of course, following up these traces will entail more than simply summarizing the works of various feminist thinkers; my interpretation will of necessity be a constructive one. I shall lay the groundwork for this constructive reading by attempting to work out the logic behind the motif that I want to highlight. Then, in the second section of the essay, I shall look to particular thinkers and themes to flesh out this abstract logic. This will involve a consideration of what various feminist thinkers have to say about An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 228, 252, 302 (n. 36); Dorothee Slle, Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), p. 185. 5 To say that human beings choose to "enact" the divine seems to convey the proper sense, then. Note that "enact" can mean, first of all, "to legislate," which carries a creative, active sense, and that is part of what I want to highlight about the feminist reformulation of the divine. But "enact" can also mean "to put on a play," in which case the persons who "act" are not acting as autonomous egos but are the vehicles for something else, namely, the identities that they are representing on the stage. Similarly, to enact the divine is to actualize the self's creative powers at the same time that the self is formed by something beyond itself. Buber's interpretation of the I-Thou relationship can be used not only as a key to how the self is formed as it enacts the divine but also as a model or analogue for the phenomenon of enactment itself: just as the relation enacted between I and Thou is not something unreal and merely external to I and Thou, so the relation to be discussed here, a relation enacted between the self and nature, other selves, and the power of being-itself, is something very real and something more than the sum of its constituent elements. Indeed, this relation is the divine (in contrast to the more traditional perspective that results from Buber's own theological extrapolations from his I-Thou anthropology, according to which God is not a relation that human beings enact, but one of the poles in a relation, the Eternal Thou).
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the pragmatic bent of feminist theological method, the notion of divine immanence, and the centrality of relationship in human existence. In the final section of the essay, I shall attempt to situate the feminist enactment model of deity in the wider contemporary discussion.
I
The logic at issue begins with the familiar observation that traditional male theologies are ideological. These theologies invariably employ male images to describe God-Father, Lord, King-and such images reflect and reinforce patriarchal power. One response to this observation might be to embrace an abstract philosophical perspective that promises to take us beyond ideological descriptions of the divine. From this perspective one supposedly recognizes that God is a transcendent reality that cannot be modeled in terms of human attributes and experiences. We cannot rely on human gender categories in our attempt to understand God. Instead, we must reach for abstract formulations such as the identification of God with being-itself. Or perhaps we should rest content with an apophatic theology, according to which we can only say what the divine is not, never what it is.
The suggestion here is that a carefully wrought philosophical theology can protect us from ideologically motivated notions of God. But a thoroughgoing feminist is bound to ask whether this isn't all a bit naive. Why should we assume that the philosophical vantage point from which we are trying to root out ideology is not itself ideological? This line of questioning uncovers an interesting paradox: a feminist might attempt to reveal masculine imagery for God to be ideological and inadequate by arguing that God's radical transcendence gives the lie to any description of the divine drawn from the realm of human experience. But this very notion of divine transcendence might be a peculiarly male creation, an expression of the assumption that the hierarchical structure of patriarchal society mirrors the divine-human relationship.
Thus, the attempt to avoid patriarchal ideology by eschewing all gender-specific imagery and insight in favor of philosophical abstractions soon breaks down. This is not to say that all descriptions of divinity are necessarily ideological, nor even less that all uses of reason are ideologically deformed, but only that this particular and familiar philosophical avenue turns out to be a dead end. But this is hardly the avenue that a committed feminist would choose in any case, for the feminist religious thinker typically wants to accomplish more than simply the negative task of removing destructive patriarchal elements from our notion of the divine. She wants, in addition, to find a notion of divinity that valorizes women's experiences and that empowers women in their spiritual, social, and political quests. Hence the decision to draw directly and unapologetically from women's experience in the attempt to talk about the divine. Most feminist theologies will make no effort, then, to be disinterested or (naively) objective: they will be self-consciously interested and perspectival, rooted in women's histories, experiences, and aspirations.
This This challenge sets up the final step in the logic of feminist religious thought; it makes clear where the trajectory of feminist theology ultimately leads. The feminist perspective can be defended against the Freudian charge of illusion by arguing that the charge misunderstands feminist theology's notion of divinity. The Freudian critique rests on the assumption that the religious person believes in a God who is a supernatural reality independent of the self. Because this belief is a function of what the individual wishes to be the case rather than a matter of reason and evidence, it must be dismissed as an illusion. After all, what we wish to be the case has no necessary connection with what is in fact the case about entities that are independent of us. But theology need not conceive of God as a reality independent of human projects and sensibilities, but can understand God instead as a reality that is actualized through those sensibilities and projects. The divine is a relation that human beings decide to enact. Theology's task, then, is not to gain access to and make claims about some objective entity that it naively supposes is "out there," but to actualize the divine. This claim follows naturally on the feminist inclination to pursue a theology that is, in the fullest sense of the phrase, a theology "from below," a theology that is openly a function of women's experiences and goals. In short, what women in their quest for justice wish to be the case is, quite appropriately, constitutive of the divine.
It is important to note at the outset that this conception of the divine as a relation enacted by human beings goes well beyond the vision of the ultimate found in thinkers such as Heidegger and Tillich. Granted, both Heidegger and Tillich envision a nonobjective ultimate, and both tie the ultimate to the human subject. For the early Heidegger, one can only talk about Sein in relation to Dasein. And, for Tillich, one can only make sense of being-itself by reference to human being, through which being-itself is manifest as courage, the triumph over the threat of nonbeing. But both the relation between Sein and Dasein and that between being-itself and human being have an element of structural necessity about them that does not characterize the relationship between human beings and the sacred suggested by feminist theology. From the feminist perspective that we are exploring, human beings choose to enact the divine.
Again, in Hegel's panentheism it is human thinking that brings the Absolute to full self-consciousness. But this is a necessary process, not one human beings choose to initiate. While the Absolute requires human consciousness as a vehicle through which to realize itself, this process is nonetheless largely independent of human freedom, and the Absolute must therefore be regarded as self-originating, a causa sui. By contrast, to say that human beings can choose to enact the divine is to suggest that God is not self-originating, however much God may finally transcend the human beings who enact God.
II
Having explored the general logic leading to the enactment model of deity, we must turn to specific positions staked out by particular feminist thinkers, beginning with their commitment to a pragmatic theological method. A radically pragmatic theological method, that is, one that begins from pragmatic principles, implies one of two things: either the theologian has fallen prey to illusion in the Freudian sense, in that she or he assumes that what one wishes to be the case about the world, what would be useful for human purposes, provides insight into the nature of a selforiginating deity; or one recognizes that the divine is not self-originating but is something that human beings decide to enact. But isn't there a third alternative, something between these two extremes? Suppose that we conceive of God as self-originating, yet radically immanent. This deity would be intimately connected with our own being. Perhaps in this case we could argue that our own wishes for justice and our projects on its behalf do provide insight into the reality of the divine, but that our projects do not enact the divine. This God is sufficiently immanent for us to assume that our quest for justice mirrors her being, but ontologically independent at least to the degree that she is not beholden to human beings for her existence.
But how do we know that there is such a God in the first place? How do we settle on this notion of deity? If a theology is radically pragmatic, if it uses pragmatic principles as its starting point, then it will have to make this decision too on pragmatic grounds. But, then we must ask all over again on what grounds we can assume that our wishes and projects can tell us about the nature of God, unless of course God is acknowledged to be not just accessible through those wishes and projects but in some sense a function of them. There is an all-important difference, then, between a radical theological pragmatism and pragmatic or instrumental approaches directed toward the natural world: in the latter case, the existence of the reality one seeks to know is not at issue. A pragmatist philosopher will probably point out that one never knows the world in and of itself apart from our projects, but the world is nonetheless a given, and it even asserts its independence by resisting some of our projects to shape it. There is no such giveness or resistance in the theological realm. As a result, we confront the notorious fact that there are almost no characteristics of the divine on which all investigators are forced to agree.
It turns out, then, that the proposed third alternative, focused on an immanent deity that is nonetheless self-originating, cannot issue consistently from a theology that begins with pragmatic principles, but only from a theology that starts with a notion of God derived from authority, or tradition, or faith, or argument, or some other source, and only subsequently brings pragmatic principles to bear.
Some of the most influential feminist theologies have a pragmatic starting point. This does not necessarily mean that the thinkers who have created these theologies subscribe to a particular school of philosophical pragmatism. Rather, it is a general methodological tendency that is at issue here: these feminist thinkers self-consciously intend to construct images of the divine that will empower women, and this is their primary criterion, their starting point, for determining what they take to be the truth about deity. Of course, we can uncover some connections between various feminist theologies and particular schools of philosophical pragmatism. Some feminist theologians do after all make explicit use of pragmatist thinkers. Rebecca Chopp, for instance, draws on the work of Charles Peirce.7 And John Dewey's famous pragmatist dictum that "the hypothesis that works is the true one" certainly applies to the feminist methodological bent that is of interest here.8 Furthermore, both William James and Dewey, when they speak about religion, think of their pragmatic criterion of truth as a matter not of abstract intellectual usefulness, but as one of existential or moral usefulness. Thus, James claims that religion produces consequences "useful to life,"' and Dewey links faith with the project of unifying the self and striving for our moral ideals.'1 But the specifics of James's pragmatism are tied up with his "radical empiricism," as the specifics of Dewey's pragmatism are tied up with his "empirical naturalism," and it is thus not to be expected that feminist theologians will necessarily want to embrace these specifics or those of any other school of philosophical pragmatism.
Ruether's Sexism and God- Talk If a pragmatic methodological bent is central to the whole notion of enacting the divine, so too is the concept of divine immanence. For, while not every theology that emphasizes divine immanence implies that we enact the divine, a perspective according to which we enact the divine will have to embrace divine immanence. One might claim that God is both immanent and transcendent and understand that claim in such a way that God holds on to most of the attributes of the traditional Supreme Being, for example, the ability to miraculously intervene in history and to resurrect human beings after death. This would be a God, in other words, who has a transcendent pole that owes much to traditional Western descriptions of deity, but who can also be said to embrace the finite in God's own being. Now in a theology according to which we enact God, one might also speak in terms of both immanence and transcendence. There will necessarily be an emphasis on immanence in such a theology, One might well argue that the rejection of the traditional emphasis on life after death by feminist thinkers such as Ruether and Christ does imply something about the being of the divine. A divinity who does not deliver us from death perhaps cannot deliver us. And she cannot because she is rooted in nature and the finite. Perhaps one can even construct a continuum of positions on life after death and show how each position corresponds to a particular notion of the being of God: traditional Christian theism puts great emphasis on a literal restoration of the individual after death, and it sees God as a supernatural person, wholly independent of the finite, natural world; Whiteheadian process theism often rejects the continued self-conscious existence of the individual after death in favor of "objective immortality" in the consequent nature of God, and its God is a limited, albeit self-originating, deity rather than an omnipotent Supreme Being; feminist theologians such as Ruether and Christ discourage the interest in life after death altogether, and their deity is not a transcendent individual, nor even self-originating, but a reality that human beings enact.
The underlying logic of feminist theology leads to the conclusion that human beings enact the divine. And the radical pragmatism embraced by many feminist theologians entails an enactment theology. Furthermore, the emphasis on immanence so evident in feminist religious thought is supportive of the enactment model. There is but one more piece of the puzzle to be put in place, then, namely, the centrality of relationship in feminist theology. In Weaving the Visions, Plaskow and Christ make clear that relationality is constitutive of human being for feminist theologians, and they note a connection between the feminist emphasis on relationality and that on divine immanence: the authors whom their collection anthologizes "agree that the self is essentially relational, inseparable then I may also recognize that I cannot set myself up in a position of dominance over other beings; I may come to accept the limitations of my own being and my responsibilities toward other beings, both human and nonhuman. And this relation to the cosmic matrix and the beings that it grounds enacts the divine. God/ess appears as this salvific relation, as this "renewed community of creation." Buber's philosophy of the self comes into play here, for while "I" must in some sense decide to engage in this relationship, the character of the "I" is determined by the relation itself. The relation empowers a new way of being for the "I."
The difference between the undergirding power of nature considered by itself and the larger religious relation of which it is an essential, catalytic element is nicely, if unintentionally, suggested by the contrast between Ruether's two expressions "cosmic matrix of matter/energy" and "Primal Matrix." While the former suggests a dispassionate, even technical attitude, the latter has a poetic resonance. Again, while the word "matrix" in "cosmic matrix of matter/energy" is at least quasi-scientific, when it is capitalized and juxtaposed with "Primal," it much more readily displays its original meaning of "womb" and its etymological connection with the word "mother."37
It is important to note the genuine interplay of transcendence and immanence here. Because God/ess is a relation that we enact, divine being is radically immanent. But because there are constituent elements of this relation that transcend us-the matrix of nature and all of the beings that it contains-and because the relation itself taken as a whole is infinitely more than our own being and sustains us in a new and more productive way of being even as we enact it, the divine is also transcendent.
The same reading can be made of Ruether's most recent book, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing. "To believe in divine being," she tells us, means to believe that the qualities of consciousness and altruism that we find in the human species "are rooted in and respond to the life power from which the universe itself arises."38 But are these qualities rooted in that undergirding life power in the way in which an Aristotelian effect is rooted in its cause, so that the effect can possess only those qualities already found full-blown in the cause? Or is it through the relationship between the human species and the underlying life power that these qualities first come into being? If we choose the latter option, then it appears that the power of life is not itself divine so much as the relation that is enacted between human beings and the power of life.
37 "Matrix" is derived from the Latin matrix, which is related to mater, "mother." Compare ibid., p. 49. 38 Ruether, Gaia and God (n. 4 above), p. 5.
519
Other feminist theologies exhibit a similar pattern. Daly, for instance, often appears to equate the divine with the "power of being."39 But just what "is" the power of being? At one point Daly explains that "Be-ing is the verb that says the dimensions of depth in all verbs, such as intuiting, reasoning, loving, imaging, making, acting, as well as the couraging, hoping, and playing that are always there when one is really living."40 But if all verbs are included, as Daly asserts, then "Be-ing" or "power of being" must also point to the dimensions of depth in hating, killing, mutilating, and so on.41 It seems unlikely, then, that Daly would want to equate the Goddess with the power of being in any simple, unqualified fashion. Her intention is probably more clearly expressed in her claim that the Goddess is "the Self-affirming be-ing of women."42 This suggests that divinity is not to be identified with the power of being but, rather, with a particular way in which women can tap into the power of being in themselves and make it productive of a new feminist consciousness and mode of existence. Women enact divinity in themselves through a particular relation to the power of being.
Similarly, Carol Christ focuses on nature in her own "journey to the Goddess," but not nature by itself. She explains that "Goddess symbolism unites two themes in my work: she is woman and she is nature."43 That is, Goddess is not to be equated with nature, but understood as a special kind of relation that can obtain between women and nature. The Goddess is born when women come to understand their rootedness in nature and finitude and claim the power that such rootedness confers. This is, says Christ, "a deeply relational power, which comes from understanding the connection of my power of being to that of all other life." 44 The telos of all of these radically relational theologies, namely, the enactment model of deity, is succinctly expressed in Dorothee Sille's observation that "today, the dispute over whether God can be thought of beyond us as resting in himself and unrelated, or whether God is the relationship itself and can be thought of only as relationship, seems to me to be one of the most important arguments between male-patriarchal and feminist theology."45
III
The enactment model of deity suggested by some feminist theologians can be read as a dialectical reconfiguration of traditional Western theism. Traditional theism thinks of God as an independent supernatural being who has created the universe. Modernity negates this theism by declaring the God of theism to be a mere fiction, a projection based on infantile psychological needs or on the economic substructure of a particular society. That current of feminist theology according to which we enact God negates the modern negation of theism by reconceiving God as neither a supernatural individual nor a mere fiction, but a transformative relation that human beings choose to enact. This God is both radically immanent and genuinely transcendent.
Perhaps the Heideggerian and Tillichian approaches to the ultimate can also be described as dialectical reconfigurations of theism. But the feminist approach can be distinguished from them. Heidegger's ontology focuses on the notion of the "ontological difference": Being is not to be confused with beings. Being is no-thing. When Heidegger's thought is moved into a theological register, as it is in the work of Tillich, one might talk about the "theological difference": God is not to be confused with beings. God is not a being, but being-itself, the ground and abyss of being. Where the feminist enactment model of deity is concerned, we should perhaps speak of the "thealogical difference": God (or Goddess) is not a being, but neither is God to be identified with being-itself. Rather, God is a particular kind of relation between human beings and being-itself, nature, and other beings.
It may be tempting to situate this feminist approach to the being of God by labeling it "postmodern." After all, it is a negation of modernity's negation of theism. But the term "postmodern" is, at best, uninformative and, at worst, misleading. First, the label "postmodern theology" is annoyingly ambiguous, in that it is used to describe everything from fideistic theologies that reject the modern demand for argument and justification-for example, the work of D. Z. Phillips and Alvin Plantingato theologies informed by contemporary poststructuralist theory-the work of Mark C. Taylor, Edith Wyschogrod, and Charles Winquist, for instance.
Second, a recurring theme in postmodern theory, as the term is ordinarily used outside theology, is the disappearance of the human subject conceived as a unified personal center. Yet, some of the most influential feminist theologians apparently have no interest in abandoning the centered self. In Daly's vision of woman, for instance, centeredness is crucial: "Unlike the suspended, crucified, self-sacrificing victim, she stands stably
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The Journal of Religion on the earth, Self-assuring and Self-centering."46 Daly celebrates "SelfCentering Spinsters" who move about the axis of their own be-ing.47 And Ruether calls us "to affirm the integrity of our personal center of being, in mutuality with the personal centers of all other beings across species and, at the same time, accept the transience of these personal selves."48 One of the manifestations of the oppression of women is that women "scarcely have been allowed individuated personhood at all."49 Abandonment of the notion of personal centeredness hardly seems the effective course of action for a feminist, then.
Third, a characteristic sensibility of postmodernism is summed up in Jean-Frangois Lyotard's oft-quoted statement that the postmodern is "incredulous towards metanarratives."50 But feminist theology appears committed to something approaching a universal emancipatory narrative. To be sure, feminist theologians are becoming ever more sensitive to the pluralism within their own ranks and are quick to attack any "false universalism."51 But consider Daly's Gyn/Ecology. Daly clearly wants to be able to make a cross-cultural critique; she feels confident that she can and must condemn Indian suttee, Chinese foot binding, African genital mutilation, European witch burnings, and American gynecology. It seems unlikely that such cross-cultural moral indictment is possible if one abandons metanarratives altogether. 52 The feminist notion of God as a relation that human beings enact, then, must be deemed a distinctive contribution to the contemporary discussion of deity: it stands apart from the Heideggerian ontological difference, the Tillichian theological difference, and cannot easily be fit into the category of the postmodern. While feminist religious thinkers have 46 Daly, Gyn/Ecology, p. 388. 47 Ibid., p. 391. 48 Ruether, Gaia and God (n. 4 above), p. 251. 49 Ibid. 
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Enacting the Divine been concerned first and foremost with fashioning a conception of God that empowers women in their various liberatory struggles, there are also more purely conceptual strengths to be found in their descriptions of the divine. Theologians, feminist and otherwise, would do well to begin plumbing these strengths.
